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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

OREGON
Envtl. Quality Comm'n v. City of Coos Bay, 14 P.3d 649 (Or. Ct. App.
2000) (holding the Environmental Quality Commission improperly
imposed civil penalties for discharging sewage sludge without a permit
based upon an incorrect interpretation of state statutory law).
The City of Coos Bay ("City") operated a sewage disposal system
and treatment plant, which partially treated sewage and then pumped
it through a pressure pipeline to a sludge lagoon for further
treatment. The City had a National Pollution Discharge Elimination
System ("NPDES") permit to operate the sewage disposal system. The
NPDES permit specified effluent limitations for waste discharged from
the system. In September 1996, the pipe between the treatment plant
and the sludge lagoon ruptured, spilling partially treated sewage
The Environmental Quality
sludge into nearby tidal wetlands.
Commission ("EQC") issued an Order imposing civil penalties against
the City for, among other things, discharging sewage sludge without a
permit in violation of state statute. The City sought review of the
Order.
On appeal, the City argued the statute did not apply because it
prohibited discharges only from a sewage disposal system without a
permit, and the City had obtained a NPDES permit for its sewage
disposal system. The City contended that a separate provision of the
statute covered the violations of permit terms, which it agreed it did
violate. EQC argued any discharge in violation of the conditions of a
permit was an "unpermitted" discharge. Accordingly, any discharge in
violation of a permit was a discharge "without first obtaining a permit."
The Oregon Court of Appeals noted the specific provision of the
statute said nothing about violations of the specific terms and
conditions of a permit and did not prohibit discharges in violation of
particular permit conditions. The statute only averred that before any
discharge from a sewage disposal system occurred, the operator of the
system had to obtain a permit. The court further noted that a separate
provision of the statute addressed violations of the terms and
conditions of a permit. The court held EQC's construction of the
provisions of the statute was redundant. Consequently, the court
reversed that part of the Order that imposed penalties for discharging
sewage sludge without a permit.
Dawn Watts
PENNSYLVANIA
Shanmoski v. PG Energy, 765 A.2d 297 (Pa. 2000) (holding: (1)
violation of a statute designed to protect a particular class of individual
is negligence per se; (2) an "Act-of-God" does not preclude liability for
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negligence if such negligence was a substantial factor in the resulting
damages; and (3) calculation of damages, particularly delay damages,
must be adequately documented for explanation of determination).
Appellees, Stephen and Dorothy Shamnoski, owned property
located along the banks of Springbrook Creek in Luzerne County,
Pennsylvania. Appellants, PG Energy, owned and operated three water
supply dams located upstream from the Shamnoskis' property ("Dam
System"). On September 27, 1985, Hurricane Gloria hit Luzerne
County. Severe flooding and overflow of Springbrook Creek destroyed
completely the Shamnoskis' real and personal property.
The Shamnoskis filed suit claiming PG Energy's negligent
maintenance and repair of the Dam System caused the flooding and
subsequent loss of property. The trial court agreed and awarded
damages to the Shamnoskis. Evidence presented at trial indicated the
Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") notified PG Energy on several
occasions of serious deficiencies in its Dam System and it subsequently
classified the Dam System as a high hazard reservoir pursuant to the
Dam Safety and Encroachment Act ("Act"). The Corps advised PG
Energy to maintain twenty-four hour surveillance of the Dam System
during periods of unusually heavy rain. Evidence presented at trial
indicated no surveillance of the Dam System occurred after 2:30 p.m.
on the date the Hurricane struck.
On appeal, PG Energy made several arguments against liability.
First, PG Energy argued it did not breach any duty owed to the
Shamnoskis or other downstream residents. Second, PG Energy
argued any negligence on its part was not the cause of the Shamnoskis'
damages.
Third, PG Energy argued the trial court abused its
discretion in accepting evidence of damages that resulted in an
incorrect damage award.
With respect to PG Energy's first argument, the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania noted section 693.13 of the Act required PG Energy to
maintain the Dam System in a safe operational condition and to notify
certain authorities located downstream of the Dam System of any
condition that would threaten safety, life, or property. Further, the
court noted PG Energy had an emergency action plan in place that
imposed a duty to warn downstream residents and municipalities
under the same circumstances prescribed by the Act. The court
determined the hurricane was an event requiring notification and, as
such, PG Energy owed a duty to downstream authorities and residents
pursuant to the Act. The court determined violation of the Act
constituted negligence per se on the part of PG Energy.
Next, the court considered PG Energy's argument that its
negligence was not the cause of the Shamnoskis' damages because the
damages would have been more severe if the Dam System was not in
place during the Hurricane. The court noted liability attaches to a
negligent party if the negligent act was a significant factor in causing
the injury, regardless of the fact such negligent act combined with an
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The court determined that,
"Act-of-God" to produce damages.
although the hurricane was an Act-of-God, PG Energy's negligence was
a substantial factor causing the resulting damage.
Finally, the court considered PG Energy's argument that the trial
court abused its discretion in accepting the Shamnoskis' testimony
regarding the value of the lost property that resulted in an
inappropriate damages calculation, especially with respect to delay
damages. The court recognized the Shamnoskis' damages occurred
fifteen years before the date of the appeal and the record did indicate
many periods of inactivity. The court declined to decide whether the
trial court's calculation of delay damages was appropriate, but
remanded the case with directions that the trial court provide the
superior court with an explanation of its method for calculating the
damages awarded.
Megan Becher-Harris
RHODE ISLAND
R&R Assocs. v. City of Providence Water Supply Bd., 765 A.2d 432
(RI. 2001) (holding the City of Providence ("City") neither effected a
defacto condemnation of mill owners water rights, nor breached the
contract between the mill owners and the City regarding
condemnation compensation when the City supplied water to
communities not mentioned in the statute establishing the Scituate
Reservoir).
In 1915, the Rhode Island General Assembly enacted a statute
("Act") enabling the City of Providence Water Supply Board ("City") to
condemn lands and water in and around the north branch of the
Pawtuxet River to establish the Scituate Reservoir ("Reservoir"). The
Act specified the City and other named municipalities could receive
water from the Reservoir. Over the years, the General Assembly
amended the Act many times to allow additional communities to
receive water from the Reservoir.
In 1922, the City contracted with mills that abutted the north
branch of the Pawtuxet River downstream from the Reservoir, to
compensate them for the taking their riparian rights through the Act.
The contract specified that under section 6 of the Act, the City could
not impair the mills' residual water rights, and that all rights enjoyed
by the mills under the Act would remain in force.
The superior court certified R&R Associates, L&L Associates, and
Robert LaFerriere (collectively, "R&R") to represent a class that
constituted the successors in interest to the mills. In 1996, R&R filed
suit arguing that by allowing additional communities to use the
Reservoir over the years, the City had breached the contract and taken
their residual water and property rights without just compensation.
R&R argued the language in both the Act and the contract gave them

